

SIDC OPSCOM Report

Critical Incident Experienced on 16/03/2026


20.03.2026

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1. SIDC Continuous Trading

Single Intraday Coupling (SIDC) operates a single EU cross-zonal continuous intraday electricity market. In simple terms, buyers and sellers of energy (market participants) are able to work together across Europe to trade electricity continuously on the day the electricity is needed. The map below shows the European countries participating in the continuous intraday market.



For more information, please visit the [ENTSO-E](#) and [NEMO Committee](#) websites.¹

1.1. Normal Operational Process

The process begins when SIDC/XBID contracts open for trading at Intraday Cross-Zonal Gate Opening Time (IDCZGOT). Market Participants (MPs) can view the available contracts in each Nominated Electricity Market Operator (NEMO) via their Local Trading System (LTS) and submit orders.

Orders from all connected market areas are then consolidated into a single shared order book. If bid and ask prices are crossed, orders are automatically matched and converted into trades.

¹ This report serves to fulfil the obligation under Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management (CACM) on reporting of unexpected market downtimes towards stakeholders.


While MPs place orders in the shared order book, the origin of each order is retained. Transmission System Operators (TSOs) provide cross-zonal capacity to the market as it becomes available.

Trading in SIDC contracts continues until the relevant contract trading time ends, or until the Intraday Cross-Zonal Gate Closure Time (IDCZGCT) deadline is reached. Following gate closure, NEMOs continue to offer trading without cross-border capacity allocation, in line with the trading schedules defined in the Shared Order Book.

Finally, physical delivery of power takes place. Continuous trading may still be possible after delivery, depending on the rules and capabilities of the local TSO.

The whole process is illustrated in the figure below.

SIDC continuous normal operation process



*IDCZGCT 30 project: in some borders, 30-minute IDCZGCT is already available, others will follow. For updates, please follow the NEMO Committee and ENTSO-E websites.

CZC – cross-zonal capacity
 IDCZGCT – intraday cross-zonal gate **closure** time
 IDCZGOT – intraday cross-zonal gate **opening** time
 LTS – local trading system
 MP – market participants
 OBK – order book

The next section examines how the incident management process is applied when disruptions occur.

1.2. Incident Management Process

An incident is defined as an unwanted event in the XBID system (SIDC's IT solution), in local NEMO or TSO systems connected to XBID, or a disruption of the communication channels linking these systems. An Incident Committee (IC) call is triggered when the issue cannot be resolved through a local backup procedure and may lead to breaching a critical SIDC deadline (e.g., gate closure or gate opening).

Operational parties follow the incident management procedure to handle such cases. This procedure assumes that communication with relevant third parties (e.g., CCP, Shipping Agent, Explicit Participants) is managed by the involved TSOs and NEMOs according to their local processes.

The incident management procedure outlines how incidents are addressed, including the operation of the Incident Committee and the application of fallback solutions such as closing and reopening interconnectors, restarting market or delivery areas, or suspending trading services.

The Incident Committee is convened only for critical or major incidents affecting the XBID system, a Transit Shipping Agent system, or in case of Shipping Agent default. Other incidents may trigger the IC only if they meet predefined criteria. To avoid unnecessary IC calls, parties perform an internal check and cross-check with other parties before escalating an incident as a central issue.

When an incident impacts any Single Intraday Coupling process, the IC is convened by the IC SPOC. Participants identify the issue, assess its impact, and agree on potential solutions. The IC SPOC records all relevant information, including discussions and decisions made during the call.

At the start of the IC call, the IC SPOC or incident reporter presents the issue. The parties review actions already taken and agree on immediate measures, ensuring correct classification of the incident. Potential solutions are discussed, including recommendations from the service provider where necessary. Once a solution is agreed upon, the parties decide on its implementation and any required communication to market participants.

Typically, within two hours after the IC call concludes, the IC SPOC prepares and finalizes the IC report and shares it with all NEMOs and TSOs. The involved parties review and update the report as needed.

2. Incident Description

This report provides stakeholders with information regarding the ad hoc maintenance, including a market outage, that occurred on 16 March 2026, affecting the Single Intraday Coupling (SIDC) market.

On 16 March 2026, around 10:45, the IC SPOC observed extreme latency levels, significantly exceeding acceptable thresholds. As a result, the IC SPOC created a critical ticket with the XBID service provider, and an Incident Committee call was triggered.

During the Incident Committee call, other parties confirmed similar observations regarding the XBID latency. In addition, there was an ongoing German cross-zonal trading issue.

The XBID service provider investigated these issues and confirmed that the latency was related to incidents that occurred over the weekend (14–15 March). To address this, the XBID service provider proposed an ad hoc maintenance to reduce latency and permanently resolve the weekend incidents.

The ad hoc maintenance took place between 12:00 and 13:00 on 16 March 2026. After the maintenance, the German cross-zonal trading issue persisted but was later resolved once the German TSOs manually reopened the interconnectors at 13:45.

2.1 Timeline

Event	Time
Extreme Level Latency	2026/03/16 10:45
Service Provider’s Proposal of Ad Hoc XBID Maintenance	2026/03/16 11:12
Approval of Ad Hoc XBID Maintenance	2026/03/16 11:21
Market Halt Time	2026/03/16 12:00
Restart of Trading	2026/03/16 13:00
Resolution of German Cross-Zonal Trading Issue	2026/03/16 13:45

2.2 Incident Cause

According to the Root Cause Analysis provided by the XBID Service Provider, following the incident on 15 March 2026, inner-German interconnectors were set to Halt, as confirmed through the system message logs, which indicate that no allocations were possible. On 16 March 2026, the restoration of interconnector availability occurred as part of the normal capacity publication process. Due to diverging configuration in XBID, some interconnectors (such as Amprion-TenneT DE) were un-halted by XBID automatically, whereas other interconnectors (such as Amprion-50

Hertz) remained halted and required operator intervention to be reopened. The XBID Service Provider did not perform any action to un-halt the interconnectors as this is a task performed by TSOs.

2.3 Impact

Downtime 16/03/2026: 60 minutes (12:00-13:00)

Critical Business Process Impacted	XBID trading
Procedural Impact	N/A

3. Mitigation Measures and Lessons Learned

To ensure successful restoration of the operations and prevent the issue from happening again, the following measures have been taken:

Supplier’s Short-Term Measures The interconnector availability was restored through the standard capacity publication procedure. Service stability returned as system components resumed normal operation. The observed behavior is explained by interconnector configuration and operational recovery processes.

Supplier’s Long-Term Measures	<p>The XBID service provider resolved the issue through an ad hoc maintenance on 16 March by re-aligning the master node setup following the weekend incidents. They also ensured optimal performance by consolidating master node operations within the same data centre.</p> <p>On 17 March, the XBID service provider confirmed an issue affecting three ports and completed corrective actions, restoring normal operations.</p>
SIDC Project Lessons Learnt	N/A

